First Distinction. Third Part. On the Causality of a Sacrament as regard Conferring Grace

Question One. Whether it is Possible for a Sacrament, Perfect to any Extent whatever, to have an Active Causality with respect to Conferring Grace

262. Whether it is possible for some sacrament, perfect to any extent whatever, to have an active causality with respect to conferring grace.

263. That it is:

Augustine Homily on John 80 n.3 (and Gratian Decretum p.2 cause 2 q.1 ch.54), “What is this virtue of water, that it touch the body and cleanse the heart?” He is speaking of the water of baptism;     therefore this water cleanses the heart. But the heart, that is the soul, is not cleansed save by grace or by the cause of grace; therefore etc     .

264. Again, the Master [Lombard] in the text sets down the nature of a sacrament, and it is “a sign of grace, such that it bears its likeness and exists as its cause.” And hereby he assigns the difference between the sacraments of the New Law and the Old Law, because those of the Old Law were only signs of grace while those of the New Law are not only signs but also causes. Therefore ‘to be the cause of grace’ is the completing condition in the definition of a perfect sacrament.

265. Again in one of its prayers the Church asks, “May your sacraments, Lord, perfect in us what they contain” [Gratian, Decretum p.3 d.2 ch.34]. From this a twofold argument is made: first, that grace is asked for, and the impossible is not asked for, so it is possible for the sacraments to cause grace; second, that the sacraments are implied to contain what is asked for, that is, grace; but they do not contain grace formally (as is plain); therefore virtually or causally.

266. To the contrary:

Bernard in his sermon The Wedding Feast of the Lord n.2, “As the investiture of a canon is by a book, of an abbot by a staff, of a bishop by a ring, so are diverse divisions of graces dispensed by the sacraments.” But it is plain that the examples he gives are only signs and not causes.

267. Again, Augustine 83 Questions q.53 n.2, “Some things are what God causes by himself, as for example, the enlightening of souls.” Therefore in this way too does he cause grace.

268. Again, if a sacrament were a cause of grace it would be either a univocal or an equivocal cause. Plainly not a univocal cause, because grace cannot exist formally in a sacrament; nor an equivocal cause because an equivocal cause is simply more perfect than what it causes, and something more noble or more eminent than grace cannot exist in a sensible thing as in a subject.

Question Two. Whether it is Possible for some Supernatural Virtue to Exist in a Sacrament

269. A next question is whether it is possible for any supernatural virtue to exist in a sacrament.

270. It seems from the authority of Augustine cited above [n.263], “What is this virtue of water...?”, that it is possible.

271. Again, medicine contains formally some active virtue with respect to health; a sacrament is medicine for the soul, and a perfect one;     therefore etc     .

272. Again, nothing has a new relation without a new foundation; the thing is plain because, as is said in Physics 5.2.225b10-13 and 7.3.246a29-b21, “there is neither motion nor change to a relation save because there is motion or change to something absolute;” but what is set down as ‘sensible sign’ in the definition of a sacrament [n.194] has a new relation to grace; therefore some new absolute form exists in a sacrament; I call this absolute form ‘a new supernatural virtue’.

273. On the contrary:

If such a virtue is posited, it cannot belong to any category of being; but every real form belongs to some category of being. Proof of the first premise: by running through all the categories it is plain that it could only belong to the category of quality; but it cannot belong to that either, which I prove by running through all the species [Categories 8b26-20a16] of quality: it is not a habit or disposition, or a natural power or lack of power, or a passion or passible quality, or a form or figure;     therefore etc     .

274. Again, diverse sensible things sometimes combine in one and the same sacrament, as will be plain below in the case of several sacraments of the New Law [sc. in the discussions of each sacrament]; but the same absolute real accident cannot exist in diverse subjects; so there cannot be any one virtue that would be the real absolute form in such sacraments. But of one sacrament there is one virtue;     therefore etc     .

275. Again, every supernatural real accident is simply more perfect than any natural accident (the proof is that a natural cause has no power for the first but does have power for the second; and this lack of power seems to be only because of the eminence of the effect; so, if there were some supernatural virtue in a sacrament, it would be simply nobler than any natural quality). Therefore in the sacramental words of a sacrament there would be some absolute accident simply more perfect than every perfection of an intellectual creature, which is unacceptable.

I. Opinion of Thomas Aquinas about Each Question

A. Exposition of the Opinion

1. As to the First Question

276. One opinion [of Thomas Aquinas, Sentences IV d.1 q.1 a.4] on these questions maintains the affirmative side of the first question. For it speaks as follows: All are compelled to posit that the sacraments of the New Law are in some way causes of grace, both because of the authority of the saints (namely of Augustine, adduced for the main question [n.267], and of others), and because of the common saying that ‘the sacraments of the New Law effect what they signify’.

277. According to those who hold this opinion, the sacraments cannot be posited as causes of grace only ‘sine qua non’, because a cause ‘sine qua non’, which has no power for the effect either by effecting it or disposing for it, has no causality over the thing save as a cause per accidens. But a sacrament is not cause of grace per accidens, both because it would not then be put in the definition of a sacrament, and because that which is per accidens does not belong to art (in Porphyry). But the saints, when treating of the sacraments, deal precisely with their causality in respect of grace [n.276] - the thing is plain, because the sacraments of the New Law and of the Old are distinguished by this fact (and it is in Lombard’s text). But if the former and latter sacraments were to signify grace only, then although the former could signify more perfectly than the latter, there would be no distinction in them as to idea of cause and non-cause. For there would only be a distinction in different ideas of signifying, which in no way bestows the idea of causing or not causing.

278. How a sacrament, then, is a cause of grace is posited as follows. An efficient cause is distinguished in two ways. In one way, on the part of the effect, into the dispositive (which induces a preceding effect) and the perfective (which induces the principal effect). In another way, on the part of the efficient cause, into the principal and the instrumental cause. Now an instrument has a double action: one by its own nature, and another as it is moved by the principal agent. And when it has the second action it also has the first at the same time. Also, by the second action it always attains something beyond what it attains by the first action, otherwise it would not be an instrument. And that which it attains by the second action (which belongs to it as it is moved or is an instrument) is sometimes the principal term of the agent, and sometimes only a disposition for the term.

279. Applied to the issue at hand, water by its natural form has its own operation, namely to cleanse or moisten the body. But beyond this, as it is an instrument of divine mercy, it has a further effect, not indeed for grace (as if it also attained it in virtue of the principal agent), but for preceding disposition, and this in some sacraments is the character, but in others it is some ornament of the soul proportionate to the character. So a sacrament does not, therefore, act instrumentally for grace but dispositively, for by its action (which belongs to it as instrument) it does not attain grace but a disposition preceding grace.

280. And this view, according to those who hold it [Thomas Aquinas, Sent. d.1 q.1 a.4], is consonant with the statement of the Master in the text, who says that “man does not seek salvation from the sacraments as if coming from them, but as coming from God through them.” For the preposition ‘from’ denotes the principal agent cause, and the preposition ‘through’ indicates an instrumental cause.

2. As to the Second Question

281. To the second question it is said [Thomas Aquinas, Sent. d.1 q.1 a.4], in accord with this opinion, that there is in sacraments a supernatural virtue that is not just an ordering to an effect, because ‘virtue’ always indicates the principle of acting. But the principle of an action, as proved in Physics 5.2.225b10-13, is some absolute form.

282. Of what sort is this virtue is shown by a distinction:

For a virtue that is the principle of acting is always proportioned to the agent, and a principal agent acts according to the exigency of its form; and so the active virtue in the agent is a form possessing complete being.

An instrument, however, acts as moved by another, and so virtue belongs to it as proportioned to the motion; but motion is an incomplete being, as a being that is in between potency and act, Physics 3.1.201a9-11. And so the virtue of an instrument as instrument has a being that is incomplete, not fixed in nature (just as the virtue of affecting sight is in the air as it is an instrument moved by a body). But these sort of imperfect beings, which are in a state of becoming, are customarily wont to be called intentions (in the way that the virtue in air for affecting sight is called the ‘intention of the color’ [cf. Ord. II d.13 n.15, d.38 nn.8-10]).Scotus Rep. A d.13 q. un.: “By this word ‘intention’ is meant in one way an act of will; in a second way the formal idea in a thing (as the intention of a thing from which the genus is taken differs from the intention from which the difference is taken); in a third way a concept; in the fourth way the idea of tending to an object (as a likeness is said to be the idea of tending to that of which it is the likeness).” ⁴ The spiritual virtue, therefore, which is in a sacrament as it is an instrument, is in it as in a state of becoming, like an incomplete or intentional being.

283. And if it be argued that there cannot be any spiritual virtue in a body, the response, according to what has been said [n.282], is that although there cannot be a spiritual virtue there according to complete being, yet there can be a spiritual virtue there incompletely, by way of intention, as is illustrated in many examples:

First, surely, because ‘audible speech’ is in this way ‘an existent cause of learning’, as the Philosopher says in De Sensu et Sensato 1.437a12-13, and it in some way contains the intentions of the soul, whose concepts are somehow expressed in speech.

Second, because thus is the virtue of art present somehow in the instrument moved by the artisan.

Third, because thus is there somehow in the motion of a celestial body the virtue of the separate substance that moves it, according to the philosophers.

Fourth, because semen acts thus in virtue of the soul, as is said in On the Generation of Animals 2.1.735a4-26, and this is touched on by the Commentator in Metaphysics 7 com.31.

B. Rejection of the Opinion

1. As to the First Question

284. Against this opinion as to its position on the first question I argue as follows:

a. First Argument

285. First as follows: a creature cannot act instrumentally for a term of creation, according to him [nn.276-280], and this, as he says elsewhere [ST Ia q.45 a.5], is above all manifest about corporeal substance (of which sort a sacrament is). But the disposition previous to grace, of the sort he posits [n.279], is a term of creation;     therefore etc     .

286. Proof of the minor:

The previous disposition is a supernatural form, and anything such is as equally incapable of being drawn from the natural potency of the receiving subject, as the subject too is equally in obediential potency to any such form.

Again, since the disposition, according to him, is a disposition that necessitates for grace when there is no impediment in the receiver, it follows that in a non-indisposed soul the disposition and the grace come to be at the same time. Therefore this disposition comes to be in an instant, just as grace does. And the fact is plain, because in the introduction of a form there is succession only as to parts of the movable subject or as to parts of the form itself. But neither is present here. The first is not because the subject is indivisible. The second is not because then there could only be degrees of grace if the disposition were to be continuously larger and smaller. But it is possible for a smallest disposition to be introduced in someone who receives a sacrament, just as it is possible for a smallest grace to be infused into him. But the smallest grace only requires the smallest disposition, so there is no succession there as to different degrees in accord with which the disposition is successively introduced.

The minor is also plain in a third way, that an instrument only acts in virtue of the principal agent. Therefore, if the instrument can act over a period of time for the disposition, then it follows that God would be acting over time or successively for the same disposition. The consequent seems unacceptable, both because of the infinite power of the agent, and because of the supreme capacity of a receiving subject that does not have a contrary.

287. So therefore we may suppose from these three proofs that this disposition preceding grace that they set down could be introduced in an instant.a

a.a [Note added by Scotus] But the minor is denied [sc. by Aquinas], because what does not per se come to be is not created; a form does not per se come to be while the composite does, just as the form is not per se existent. Therefore the form is not created, because the form would not come to be by the creation.

     Again, a form that lacks an operation that the subject has no share in along with the form is not created (the proof is from On the Soul 1.1.403a10-12, “If the soul has nothing proper to itself, it is not separable from the body,” and from Generation of Animals 2.3.736b27-29, “It remains then that the intellect alone comes from outside and alone is divine; because the operation of the body has no share in its operation”). Therefore only the intellect that comes from outside, because it has an action that the body does not share any supernatural accident with, lacks an action that the subject does not share in with it. The same point is admitted about grace.

     In response to the proof of the minor it is said that the disposition is drawn from the obediential potency of the subject, therefore it is not created.

     On the contrary: every obediential potency has regard to a natural form in the subject; therefore it also has regard to some agent, because to every natural passive power there corresponds an active natural power, according to the Commentator [Authorities from Aristotle 1.137].This reply seems to be against all three of the arguments given here against the truth of the minor premise [sc. the minor that the disposition previous to grace, if it is posited, will be something that has to be created directly by God, and so not an instrument God uses for creation, n.285]. For if, as the reply says, the obediential potency in a creature is relative to the active power that realizes it, and if this active power is God acting alone without a created instrument, and if the disposition previous to grace is drawn from the obediential power, then it will be something created, regardless of whether it is a form, and regardless of whether it is unlike the intellect and grace (which are confessedly created). ⁵

288. But sacraments commonly cannot have their action in an instant, the proof of which is that words and many other things are commonly required for sacraments (as will be plain below [about each sacrament individually]), and these cannot have their being in an instant; and so they have it in time. Therefore they cannot do their natural action in an instant, and so not their supernatural action either. For, according to them [n.278], an instrument has its own action when it has the action that surpasses its own virtue.

289. Also, if any single syllable of the whole wording that is instrumental to the sacrament is imagined to have its being in an instant (which is a fiction, because the formation of this syllable involves local motion of air and motion is not in an instant), the claim is not saved. For this syllable will be either the first syllable or the last or in between, and, whichever one it is posited to be, from the fact that it and no other syllable acts for the disposition caused in an instant, it follows that it alone would suffice, and that it alone among all the others would possess the nature of the sacrament. For all the others beside it do nothing either instrumentally or in any other way for the preceding disposition. And this is unacceptable, because in such sacramental wording no single syllable is posited as the sacrament but the whole of it is.

290. But if you further imagine that the last syllable is the sacrament by way of completion, and that it performs the action attributed to the sacrament not by its own virtue but by virtue of all the preceding ones (just as “the last drop wears away the stone in virtue of all the preceding ones,” Physics 8.3.253b14-21), this is nothing. For in such cases the last stage only ever finally causes the effect in virtue of the preceding stages because the preceding stages have left behind some disposition preparing the way for the term. But these preceding syllables do not leave any such disposition behind before the last syllable;     therefore etc     .

b. Second Argument

291. Again, in the case of one of the sacraments, namely the Eucharist, the causality does not seem to be possible, whether we are speaking of the full sacrament, namely the now consecrated Eucharist, or of the sacramental consecration itself, which is the way to the sacrament.

For, if one speaks of the first way, the species of bread does not seem to be an instrumental cause that reaches the effect, that is, the real existence here of Christ’s body, or that reaches any disposition for the effect.

The same is also plain about the consecration, because the spoken words do not reach transubstantiation (which is the term of the consecration), for transubstantiation only happens by the infinite virtue of God, and this infinite virtue is equally or more manifest here than it is in creation. Nor does it reach any disposition preceding transubstantiation, because the disposition would be either in the bread or in Christ’s body. But it cannot be so in either way. For it cannot be in Christ’s body since then it would not be a disposition; nor can it be in the bread, because since the disposition would be a necessitating factor for transubstantiation it would exist in the same instant as transubstantiation does, and so in that instant there would be bread. For when the disposition exists, then the subject of it exists also at the same time. Therefore the bread where the disposition is would exist in the same instant as the transubstantiation does, which is contradictory. Likewise, it seems a pure fiction that the bread would be really altered by the words ‘for this is my body’ more than it would be altered by other spoken words, as ‘this bread is white’ and the like, since sound does not have an active virtue for causing a real alteration in bread.

c. Third Argument

292. The argument can also be made here that was made before [n.288], that sacramental words have their being in time and so they precisely have their action in time. But the disposition for the Eucharist [nn.285, 279], if it is imagined to exist, cannot be posited as caused in time, because of proofs like those mentioned above in the second argument [n.291].

293. In the matter at issue, then, there is a special reason that the words of consecration of the Eucharist cannot do anything with respect to transubstantiation, or the disposition necessary for transubstantiation, because they do not act on the passive subject until they mention it, according to them and to Aristotle (Physics 7.2.244a17-18 about the simultaneity of agent and patient). But as it is, at the instant when the speaking is complete, the species of the words are not mentioning the species of bread, because the multiplying of words only takes place in time, according to the Philosopher (On Sense and Sensible 6.446b5-9, the penultimate objection). Therefore during the time after the last instant of the complete speaking of the words, transubstantiation and the disposition preceding it have not yet happened. Therefore the bread remains throughout the whole time - which is contrary to the common opinion about the Eucharist.

d. Fourth Argument

294. The fourth argument is that this opinion posits plurality without necessity, which is against the teaching of the philosophers, as is plain from Physics 1.2.184b15-16, about the opinion of Melissus against Anaxagoras, and also from On the Soul 3.4.429a18-20 and Physics 8.3.354a24-27, that “nature does nothing in vain.” For fewness, when it suffices for saving the appearances, is always more rationally to be posited [Metaphysics 4.6.1011a17-21, Ord. I d.3 n.315]. But that such a disposition should be brought about in the case of the sacraments seems altogether superfluous. There does not seem to be any necessity for this plurality in the Eucharist, as is plain, because it seems the purest fiction to posit there some preceding disposition, or to posit some intermediate disposition in the species of bread (which are the sacrament [Ord. IV d.8 q.1 n.15]) or in the existence of the body of Christ (which is the thing signified).

295. There is proof of this in the other sacraments too, for in those that do not impress a character there seems no necessity to posit the disposition that they call an ‘ornament’ [n.279]. Indeed, this seems to be against the common opinion of the theologians. For they posit a disposition for the principal effect in some sacraments if, because of some obstacle in the receiver, the final effect is not then caused; but when the obstacle ceases the disposition suffices for the principal effect (this appears in sacraments that cause a character, which sacraments for this reason cannot be repeated). But in the case of a pretended penitent, there is nothing, when his pretense ceases, that suffices for the effect of true penitence; otherwise it would not be necessary for such a pretended penitent to be confessed another time. Therefore, no disposition is impressed in such a sacrament as if to necessitate the effect of the sacrament.

2. As to the Second Question

296. Against this opinion as to the second question I argue as follows:

If there is a supernatural virtue in the sacrament, it is there either indivisibly or divisibly, that is, either as whole in the whole and in each part, or as whole in the whole and as part in a part. Not in the first way because among all forms that perfect matter only the intellect is posited to be such. Not in the second way because the supernatural virtue would be per accidens extended in the subject, which is against the idea of a spiritual virtue.

297. Again, many words are commonly required in sacraments (as will be clear below [in the discussion of each sacrament]). Either then the same virtue would exist altogether in each syllable, or there would be different virtues in different syllables. If in the first way one would have to say that the same accident moved from subject to subject and would remain after the subject ceased to be. If in the second way the result would be that the sacrament (which consists in the whole utterance) would not have a single virtue.

298. And if you say that the sacrament has a single virtue combined from the many virtues of the many parts, this is refuted by the second argument against what the opinion says about the preceding question [n.291]. For it would not be possible to say which of these virtues was the principle of causing the spiritual effect in the soul. Nor does it seem probable that a sacrament formally one (since the formal idea of it comes from the idea of supernatural virtue) would have so many combined spiritual virtues.

299. Again, I ask when this supernatural virtue is caused in the sensible reality that pertains to the sacrament - is it before the application of it to act and use or in that very application?

If before, then the sacrament’s causation is purely miraculous, because it is by divine act and not by any disposition that abides or is stabilized in the Church; for it does not follow on anything that would enable one to say it followed naturally, as it were, without a miracle (like animation [Ord. IV d.43 q.2 n.20, on the natural animation of the body]).

But if the supernatural virtue is caused in the very application to use, this seems unacceptable. For an instrument is not formally adapted for use because someone uses it as an instrument. The point is plain by induction; and by reason, for the suitability of an instrument naturally precedes the use of the instrument as instrument (for it is not because I immerse a child in water, or use some sensible sign for the act of the sacrament, that the child receives the spiritual virtue; therefore, it is not possible to say when the child receives it).

300. A final argument is, as before [n.294], that here plurality is posited without necessity. For that there is any necessity for such a virtue as is imagined to exist in the sacrament is not plain either by natural reason (as is manifest) or by faith. For just as he who follows natural reason should not posit more beyond what is concluded by natural reason [Physics 1.4.188a17-18, 8.6.259a8-9], so he who follows faith should not posit more than what is required by the truth of faith. But the truth of faith does not require the positing of such supernatural virtue in water or in words (as will be plain below [in the discussion of the individual sacraments]), nor does reason compel this plurality.     Therefore etc     .

301. The examples that are adduced for virtue received by the instrument do not prove it.

302. The first about sensible speech [n.283] assumes something manifestly false, for audible speech does not formally have any intention of the soul in it.

As proof is that speech that does not have the signifying of anything imposed on it has no such form (as is plain to everyone); and speech does not receive any absolute form from the imposition, nor any relation save perhaps a relation of reason.

There is also proof in another way, that when there is the same principal agent and an instrument sufficient for it the same action follows. But if a Latin speaker speaks Latin words to a Greek, there is the same principal agent and the same instrument that there would be if he spoke to another in Latin, but no effect follows because no concept is caused in the Greek hearer. Therefore, the speaking was not of itself an instrument for causing a concept of the soul in the hearer.

303. The example fails, then, to this extent, that audible speech is a sign that brings a concept to memory, so that when the sense of hearing is affected by the speaking, and when further the nature of the concept as it is such a nature is understood, the intellect that knows the speech is imposed to signify such nature refers the speech to something else and understands that something else. Not, however, in such a way that the speech causes a concept of something by some form. Rather the concept is previous to what is conceived of the thing [spoken about] as caused in the soul by the proper species or phantasm of the thing.The sense of the Latin here is obscure. The point seems to be that the spoken word only informs us about the thing spoken of because, first, we already have the concept of that thing, and because, second, we are moved by the words to turn to the relevant species or phantasm of the thing so as thereby to bring actually to mind the concept we already have of it. The words, then, do nothing over and above stimulating us to turn to some species or phantasm in which to remember or rethink the concept (as the previous example of a Latin speaking to a Greek illustrates). ⁶ The point is plain because however much a speech is spoken, if the hearer does not have in himself the species of the thing spoken of, then no concept of the thing would be caused in him. Hence, we understand by spoken words only things of which we have the species. But that we actually consider these things is because we refer the sign to the thing signified.

304. The second example about the instrument of an artisan [n.283] fails, for it seems highly improbable that a spiritual form would be caused in the saw as many times as it was moved by the artisan, and that a spiritual form would cease to be as many times as the saw ceases to be actually moved.

305. The third example about motion [n.283] is not compelling because, in whatever way substances are caused by the heavens, at least the local motion of the heavens cannot be the formal principle of producing them.

306. But as to what the formal principle is, and likewise about the fourth example [n.283] from the Generation of Animals, see Lectura II d.18 nn.70, 72.

II. Opinion of Henry of Ghent about the First Question

A. Statement of the Opinion

307. For the first question, then, there is another opinion, see Henry Quodlibet IV q.37.a

a.a [Interpolated Note] Note that Henry sets down a threefold opinion about the sacraments in relation to grace.

     The first is that no supernatural virtue is to be posited in the sacraments of the New Law for creating grace, but God assists in his sacraments by a pact or agreement; and in the conferring of the sacraments he causes grace through his assistance.

     The second opinion is that the sacraments of the New Law cooperate with grace, not as acting per se and by a form existing in them, but as an instrument moved per se by the agent.

     And after setting aside these opinions he posits a third, which is his own opinion, and it is as follows: The sacraments of the New Law are said to be cause of grace,* not because they in any way cause it more than the sacraments of the Old Law did, but because they contain that which is cause of grace - either really, as does the sacrament of the Eucharist, in which is really contained the humanity of Christ conjoined to his divinity (therefore is the Eucharist said most of all to contain and effect grace), or virtually, as does the sacrament of Baptism, which namely causes grace in virtue of the blood of Christ, as the Apostle says in Romans 6, “As many of us as are baptized are baptized in his blood.” And he gives an example from the divinity of Christ conjoined to his humanity, which was what worked the marvels he did; hence also from this fact are the sacraments of the New Law called ‘vessels of grace’.

     And this opinion differs, it seems, from the first at least in words, because the first speaks of assistance of grace and this one of insistence of grace etc.

     [*.. .in no way do the sacraments do anything to create grace, nor do they attain grace in creating it more than the sacraments of the Old Law did. But they are only said to be cause of grace present of which they are the signs, in that they contain that which is per se creative cause of grace, insofar as it creates grace. For although God, who is the creator of grace, is in everything by essence and substance, yet he is, as to some effects, in one thing such that he is not in another...and thereby, because the deity existing in Christ’s hand cured the leper as principal agent, Christ’s hand is said to have cured the leper as instrumental agent. So that, accordingly, we may say that the sacraments of the New Law are causes of grace instrumentally.because God, as he is existent in them, confers grace by creating grace in them when they touch those to whom they are administered. And in this way are they said to be creative ‘instruments of grace’...and similarly ‘vessels of grace’, insofar as they contain him who is the fount and origin from whom the grace, as it is in them, emanates.]

B. Rejection of the Opinion

308. I argue against this opinion as follows: God is in the sacrament as to his presence, essence, and power not otherwise than in another body. Therefore, if he is posited as being there in some other way, this is only as to his causing some effect. But that he is there in this other way cannot be through any causality of the sacrament, for a sacrament is in no way a cause that determines God to cause an effect proper to himself. Therefore he is there in this way, that is, a way other than he is in another body, only by a determination of his own will, whereby he makes disposition to cooperate thus with such a body. But this disposition, when it has been made manifest to the Church, is called a promise or pact. This opinion of Henry’s, therefore, says nothing different from what was said of the other opinion, namely about pact or agreement.

III. Scotus’ own Opinion as to the First Question

309. To the first question, then [n.262] I lay down the following statements: the necessity of things for the end is taken from the end; the end of a sacrament, according to all who speak about sacraments, is grace or some invisible effect of God disposing man for salvation; this end, in the way it is reached through the sacraments, could be reached sufficiently without saying that a sacrament has some proper action either in respect of grace (which it cannot attain since a sacrament is created), or in respect of a preceding supernatural disposition (because it would be created). From these statements it follows that such action is not to be posited, since these several things are not necessary, nor is it manifestly possible to posit them.

310. But how, along with this conclusion, may one save the fact that the sacraments are not just per accidens cause of grace and that grace is got through the sacraments in the way the saints speak of them [n.276]?

311. I say, in brief, that every disposition that necessitates a form (and is not the idea of being receptive of the form) can in some way be called an active or an instrumental cause with respect to that form.a But a sacrament itself, or the receiving of a sacrament, is such an immediate disposition, which does not cause any other intermediary between itself and grace. Therefore it can be said to be in some way an active or instrumental cause with respect to grace.

a.a [Note added by Scotus] Proof of the major: this proposition, that is, ‘every disposition that necessitates a form...’, is admitted when the disposition necessitates the form - whether by its own nature or by something intrinsic or by the natural order of some superior agent. It does not necessitate in these ways here, but only by the ordering of the acting will of God.

     On the contrary: how else is a character a necessitating disposition for a form?

     Again, in any order of causes a second thing acts in virtue of a first. So, therefore, when the first is clearly known to be acting as if acting naturally, and yet it is only by the will of a superior that the second is necessitated to causing (because the second is determined by the first that, as it acts, thus determines it) - then a disposition that necessitates by a superior will has a nature like that of an instrument, just as in other cases where its necessitation is by a superior natural agent. For never does it necessitate so as to determine the superior, because then the superior would not be superior. But it is said to be necessitating because the effect is necessarily produced by the superior through the medium of an instrument. Thus does the will, with clearly known necessity, produce the effect through the intermediary of an instrument.

     Again, whatever thing is posited as thus being between God and grace is an agent or disposer for grace, either through its proper form (and then it acts by natural necessity, because neither the water [sc. of baptism], nor the virtue in it, nor the character is a free form) - or not through its proper form but only by divine ordination.

     If in the first way, my will then will not be able to prevent the grace from being caused, because my will cannot prevent the acting of a natural agent on the subject it acts on, nor indispose that subject to being acted on.

     If in the second way, then the reply is no reply.

     I respond: it acts by its proper form, but in this sort of order, namely as the second thing and so only along with the first. The first does not act when my will is indisposed; therefore neither does the second - not that it would not act of itself if the action of the first were lacking.

312. The major [n.311] is proved by examples and by reason:

The first example is that there is absolute agreement that merits are an instrumental cause with respect to reward, and that a reward is acquired through merits. And yet merit does not in itself actively cause the reward, nor does it cause an intermediate disposition; it is only a disposition preceding reward, as the idea of being receptive of reward.

313. Another example: motion is in some way posited as a cause with respect to the term of the motion, and the fact that the term is attained through the motion is agreed to truly and properly. Yet the motion does not possess any action for causing the term, nor even for causing an intermediate disposition; but it is a disposition proximate to the term and not the idea of being receptive of it.

314. Again, the same major [n.311] is proved by reason as follows: what is cause of something prior is not, for this reason, a cause of something posterior unless the thing in between [sc. the prior, between the cause and the posterior] is cause of the third [sc. the posterior], and is so in some way in the same order of cause. An agent that causes a disposition proximate to a form (according to them [nn.278-280]) is admitted to be in some way a cause as regard the form. So the disposition proximate to the form must be reduced to the genus of efficient cause as regard the form.

315. The manner of it, then, is as follows: the receiving of a sacrament is a disposition necessitating the effect signified by the sacrament - not indeed by any intrinsic form through which it may necessarily cause the form, or cause some disposition previous to it, but only through God’s assistance causing the effect. God does not necessarily cause the effect absolutely but with a necessity relative to his ordained power. For God has universally disposed, and has so assured the Church, that he will confer the signified effect on someone who receives the sacrament.

316. Nor does it matter that the receiving of the sacrament is something to do with the body of the receiver but the grace is something caused in the soul. For the fact that the disposition and the form are in the same subject is enough and, above all, when the disposition is not a disposition on the part of the thing, but is a disposition in an ordering to a voluntary extrinsic agent that does cause the term.

317. To understand this, one needs to note that an instrument, in the most commonly accepted use of the term, is sometimes extended to include a second cause, as was touched on in the first question [n.120], though it is properly distinguished from a second cause, and sometimes it is taken for a part through which the whole acts - and in this way does the Philosopher speak, On the Soul 2.1-2.412a27-13a10, when he calls the organs of the senses and of other powers instruments, or parts, through which the whole performs such operations. In a second way an instrument is said to be an active cause for a preceding disposition. In a third way it is spoken of as an instrument of art, and from this is the word first derived.

318. But there is a doubt whether an instrument of art is properly active.

And it seems more probable that it is not. For a saw has in itself only quantity, figure, and local motion, about all which it is plain that they are not active forms. And the proof is that otherwise the mathematician, when he considers the ‘how much’ of figures, would not abstract from motion.

319. But if it is supposed that hardness is an active quality, this is nothing, because if God, by his absolute power, preserved something soft in the same quantity and figure, he would, by moving it locally, divide a body just as the hard instrument now divides it. So hardness, which is a quality, is not the formal principle of acting. But it does appear to be so, to the extent that it is a certain resistance to being affected by a corrupting force; and if it is moved locally while the quantity and figure of the body remain and nothing else is changed or corrupted, it must remove some matter proportioned to its quantity and figure, which would not be the case if its quantity did not remain but gave way, as is the case with something soft.

320. A proof of the claim is also that wherever there is a formal incompossiblity in a creature, one of the incompossible things does not actively expel the other but only formally; but an agent that introduces one of them does effectively expel the other. Now bodies seem to have incompossiblity with respect to the same ‘where’, just as contrary qualities do in respect of the same subject. So just as the same agent introduces heat effectively, so does it also expel cold. The heat, however, does not expel the cold effectively but only formally; so too in the claim about the expulsion of a body from where it is by another body. But the dividing of wood by a saw or an axe is only the expulsion of parts from where they are to where the axe moves them by the artisan’s cutting it.

321. In maintaining, then, that artificial instruments are not formally active but only receptive of some prior effect ordered to the ultimate effect, the claim is made clearer about how a sacrament can be called an instrument, although it does not have an active power properly with respect to the term, but is a certain prior effect ordered toward grace.

322. And if it be said that the cases are not alike, because the sacrament does not receive the superior effect the way an axe receives motion - this is not a problem, because just as the whole (which receives the prior effect) can be called an instrument, so too can the effect received be in some way said to be an instrument; for it can truly be said that the wood is divided by the motion of the saw; but a sacrament, or the receiving of the sacrament, is the prior effect in the matter at issue;     therefore etc     .

IV. Scotus’ Opinion as to the Second Question

323. To the second question [n.269] the answer is plain from the same point [nn.321-322], that it is not manifestly possible, nor in any way necessary, to posit the virtue that is a real form in the sacrament. For to what purpose would this form be so many times generated and so many times corrupted? Nor, if it were posited, would anything be caused by it in the soul; nor would it even be caused regularly save by divine pact or agreement with the Church. And thus, without so many superfluous intermediaries in the water and the soul, the claim can be saved that the divine pact is immediate in regard to conferring the effect on the recipient of the sacrament.

324. But if, because of the authorities [nn.270, 276], a dispute is raised about the word ‘virtue’, one can say that a virtue is in one way ‘the ultimate in power’, from On the Heavens 1.11.281a10-12. But the ultimate in power of a practical sign is that it be effective in signifying, that is, signify beforehand and with certitude; for no greater power could belong to a sign insofar as it is a practical sign.

325. However, such virtue can be admitted to exist in the sacrament. But this virtue is not some absolute form but only a relation of conformity with the thing signified. And whether it belongs to the essence of the sacrament - (and then the sacrament would have to include, not only the idea of a sign along with its differences, but also some idea of conformity with the thing signified, which is called the truth in the sign [n.192]; and it is plain that one of these relations is an accident of the other, and the posterior is as it were founded on the other prior one; for the conformity is founded on the sign and there could be a sign without it) - or whether it does not belong to the idea of the sacrament but is an accident concomitant with it for the most part, yet at any rate this idea is the ultimate in power of a practical sign, and thus is it a virtue.

V. To the Initial Arguments of the First Question

326. To the first argument [n.263] I say that the water cleanses the heart, that is, the soul, not indeed by causing a disposition between it and the cleansing grace, but that it cleanses as a disposition proximate and immediate to grace (in the way in which merit is said to induce blessedness, or that cutting or some other preparation is said to induce health). For if it caused a disposition for grace and was thus said to cleanse, it would still be necessary to say that the disposition cleansed more immediately, as was argued above about the order of causes with respect to a third thing [n.314].

327. To the second [n.264] I say that in his definition of a sacrament the Master understands by his addition ‘and exists as its cause’ nothing other than that it is an efficacious sign. And by this he means that it is practical and certain and true, and naturally precedes what it signifies. I use the same to reply to the point about the distinction between the sacraments of the New Law and the Old Law [n.264]. For these are not distinguished by the fact that ‘actively acting for something spiritual in the soul’ could belong to neither of them, but those of the New Law cause grace as an efficacious sign, while those of the Old Law did not, if one is speaking of the sacraments, that is, the ceremonies, of the Old Law. The matter will be made plain in the next question [nn.372-381].

328. To the other one [n.265] I say that if the motion of a saw were the proximate disposition for inducing some form, and if it [the form] were not from the nature of some motion but from the disposition of some natural agent cooperating at the same time, one could reasonably ask of the agent that the motion would perfect [the form] that [the agent] contains, that is, that just as [the motion] contains [the form] as a preceding disposition contains [the form], so [the motion] would perfect [the form], that is, that [the form] would follow on [the motion] immediately. This is how it is in the proposal maintained here.The square brackets replace what in Scotus’ Latin is simply ‘it’ with no clearly grammatical indication of what the ‘it’ refers back to. My insertions in the brackets indicate what I think should be understood by each ‘it’ to make consistent sense of what Scotus is saying. ⁷

VI. The Argument of the Opinion of Thomas

329. As to the arguments brought forward in the first opinion [nn.276-280], the answer is plain from what has been said [nn.326-328]. For a sacrament is not just a cause per accidens (as neither would Thomas posit that the ornament or character was a per accidens cause with respect to grace); rather, just as he would posit that what was caused by the sacrament was a per se disposition for grace [n.279], so I say that the sacrament, or the receiving of it, is a disposition proximate to grace.

330. And hereby is plain how a disposition is put in the definition of a sacrament, and how it pertains to the art of those who treat of sacraments. For if someone were to view an incision or something of the kind insofar it is ordered to health, he would define it well and would assign the difference through this order, although this order was an accident of the nature of the thing in itself. In this way also do the holy doctors not concern themselves about the cleansing of baptism as to is nature in itself, any more than they concern themselves with the nature of any sort of bathing per se; but they view baptism insofar as it has, from divine institution, an order for grace; and therefore do they define it so and assign its differences.

VII. To the Initial Arguments of the Second Question

331. As to the first argument of the second question [n.270], it is plain that the virtue is the efficacy of the sign with respect to the thing signified, which efficacy is not a real form, above all not an absolute one, but is the truth of a practical sign virtually preceding the thing signified.

332. As to the second argument [n.271], if health could only be induced by a voluntary agent, and if this agent instituted some sign that would be an efficacious or necessitating sign with respect to himself for inducing health, the sign would be a medicine possessing virtue - not however through some absolute form that would be the principle of curing, but only through the ordaining of the efficient cause for health.

333. As to the third argument [n.272] one can say that the foundation is new as often as the sacrament is new, and then no new relation is there without a change in the foundation. But the change is not to anything absolute in the foundation, but to the being of the foundation.

334. It can be said in another way that a relation of reason can be new in something without newness of what is absolute in it, for a new comparison of the absolute to another thing by act of intellect is sufficient. In this way can God be said to be newly ‘Lord’ without any new absolute in him. Or more to the point, money can be said to be newly the price, for to be a ‘price’ only states a relation of reason, just as to be ‘exchanged’ for something else states only a relation of reason. For to be ‘exchanged’ does not state a real relation any more than to be ‘given’ does; but since to be given, as is manifest, states the relation of an object to the will, it states only a relation of reason in the thing given. Likewise, to be ‘understood’ in the understood object states only a relation of reason. 233].